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MIND, MOUSSE, AND MODERATION  
 
 
This chapter is about the ways that psychology appears in, and is used in, the 
process of research.  More particularly we will be considering the way psychological 
terms, orientations, constructions, and displays are manifest, and practically drawn 
on, in market research focus groups.  This study reflects a broader concern with what 
psychology is for in the different practices, everyday and institutional, intimate and 
public, that it appears.  The interest here is to contribute to the literature on method 
as an interactional and discursive accomplishment and at the same time to 
contribute to the broader literature of discursive psychology.  We will start with some 
comments on the general approach of discursive psychology and then consider 
research on the interactional accomplishment of research methods. 
Discursive psychology  
Discursive psychology (henceforth DP) has been developed in a series of 
studies, demonstrations and overviews, and been refined through debates with a 
varied range of cognitive and social psychologists, critical discourse analysts, 
ethnomethodologists, sociolinguists and ethnographers.  Edwards (1997) and 
Edwards & Potter (1992) are foundational texts; Edwards (2005) and Potter (2003) 
review and summarize DP; Wiggins & Hepburn (2005) and the current volume 
collect together recent DP inspired studies.   DP has a rather different object than 
most of the different traditions that have characterised psychology.  It focuses on 
psychology as embedded in interaction, and as something that gives interaction 
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sense and coherence.  Ultimately the topic of DP is psychology from the participants‟ 
perspective.   
DP is distinct from superficially similar perspectives on topics such as folk 
psychologies, mental models, person schemata, social knowledge, social 
representations or theories of mind (Gergen & Semin, 1990; Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 
1989; Leslie, 1987; Moscovici, 1984).  As Edwards and Potter (1992) have shown, this 
way of thinking about psychology starts with a perceptual cognitive picture that has 
person understanding as a form of individual perception and processing.  A mental 
model or theory processes information delivered via perception of other people.   
Rather than trying to get inside the person as these perspectives do, DP is addressing 
the psychology that is there for participants as they talk to one another, coordinate 
their actions, argue and complain, flirt and reassure.  It asks questions such as the 
following.  How are dispositions and intentions made hearable in interaction?  How 
is familiarity and emotion shown?  How are „attitudes‟ involved with actions such as 
criticisms and compliments?  Rather than seeing the task as that of attempting to 
open up the mythic black box where psychology has been thought to be hiding since 
Descartes and Locke developed their arguments, it is focused on what Edwards 
(2006) calls the „rich surface‟ of language and social interaction. 
The focus on interaction has led discursive psychologists to draw on the 
findings, methods and insights of conversation analysis, which provides the most 
sophisticated available approach for the study of talk-in-interaction.  DP also draws 
on constructionism derived from sociology of scientific knowledge.  This highlights 
the epistemic and reality productive elements of discourse, and the way these 
epistemic and psychological issues intertwine.  For example, a description of an 
event can be constructed in such a way that it produces the speaker‟s own stance as, 
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say, appropriately neutral.  Indeed, DP has shown the way that descriptions of „mind‟ 
and „reality‟ are pervasively mutually implicative.   
Up to now DP studies, and closely related work at the boundaries of CA and 
ethnomethodology, has concentrated on one of the following six interrelated and 
overlapping themes.  
1. They have studied the procedures through which the psychological 
implications of talk are managed.  For example, they have investigated the 
way different motives are established and how memories are discounted as 
flawed (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Lynch & Bogen, 2005; Watson, 1983). 
2. They have researched the way the thesaurus of psychological words is used to 
do different things in different settings.  For example, it has considered the 
use of terms such as „anger‟, „opinion‟ and „noise‟ (e.g. Edwards, 1999; Myers, 
2004; Stokoe & Hepburn, 2005). 
3. They have done studies that respecify topics that that are central to cognitive 
research perspectives such as social cognition, cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science (including scripts and schemata, categories, attitudes and 
beliefs, perception, theory of mind, the unconscious, emotions – e.g. Auburn, 
2005; Billig, 1999; Edwards, 2006). 
4. They have considered psychological „displays‟ of various kinds, where 
psychological states are „embodied‟ (Kitzinger, 2006) in the manner  of 
delivery of talk or associated items such as „gosh‟, „uuum‟ (in the context of 
food) or sobs and sniffs (Hepburn, 2004; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2005; 
Wiggins, 2002). 
5. They have examined the way psychological methods operate in practice and in 
particular the way they constitute their objects and produce them as the 
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property of individuals (e.g. Antaki, 2005; Puchta & Potter, 2002; Schegloff, 
1999).  More on this theme below. 
6. They have started to consider the relation of psychology to institutions, 
exploring the way activities in therapy, education, courts and so on are 
constituted by specifically psychological business, and how institutional 
objects are constituted as psychological or not (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1991; 
Potter, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2003). 
These themes are not intended to be definitive and completely 
comprehensive; rather they highlight some of the developments that have been most 
central.  The focus of this current chapter will be mix of theme 1, 2, 4 and 5.  It will 
consider some of the ways that psychological terms and orientations are used in 
market research focus groups, and the way they are part of constituting the 
structured organization of those focus groups.  Before that it is helpful to survey 
some of the recent work that studies social research as interactionally accomplished. 
Studies of the accomplishment of research techniques 
As our sophistication in studying interaction has increased, so it is possible to 
develop a richer understanding of the interaction that goes on in social research 
instruments such as surveys, assessments, interviews and focus groups.  In one of the 
first pieces of its kind Suchman and Jordan (1990) studied interaction in survey 
interviews.  One finding was that questions asked often departed from standardized 
question formats as interviewers worked to manage local pragmatic issues.  And they 
argued that question delivery will always require ad hoc and local negotiation, 
subverting the ideal of standardization.  This work on surveys has been considerably 
extended by Houtkoop-Steenstra (2000) and contributions to Maynard et al., 
(2002). 
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Some of this work has focused specifically on issues of psychological 
relevance.  Schaeffer & Maynard (2005), for example, consider interactive aspects of 
question delivery in standardized surveys, highlighting a range of shortcomings with 
the idea that pauses are indicators of the time respondents need for „cognitive 
processing‟.  A further group of studies has highlighted the way that interaction in 
assessment interviews, qualitative interviews, questionnaires or focus groups is 
consequential for the psychological objects that are produced by the methods 
(Antaki, 1999; Antaki & Rapley, 1996; Koole, 2003; Lee & Roth, 2004; Maynard & 
Marlaire, 1992; Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Puchta & Potter, 2002; Schegloff, 1999).   
The contribution here will be particularly focused on the role of psychological 
notions, orientations and constructions in market research focus groups. 
Market research focus groups as topic 
The materials and some of the background analysis to this chapter come from 
a project considering interaction in market research focus groups in the UK and 
Germany.  In a series of papers we have studied a range of moderator actions 
including question design (Puchta & Potter, 1999), constructing opinions as objects 
contained within individuals (Puchta & Potter, 2002) and receipting participant‟s 
contributions (Puchta, Potter & Wolf, 2004).  These actions along with broader 
issues about the way moderators shape the talk of participants are discussed in 
Puchta & Potter (2004), which also introduces some of the issues developed in this 
chapter.  This work was influenced by, and partly builds on, studies by Myers and 
Macnaghten (Myers, 1998; Myers & Macnaghten, 1999).    
This chapter will take as its topic materials from a focus group run in the UK 
on hair products.  As is common for groups of this kind, the participants sit on low 
comfortable chairs around a table which has some snack food, coffee cups and 
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ashtrays on it.  The session as a whole lasts about an hour and a half.   The moderator 
sits with her back to the video camera that records the whole group for the clients.  
See Photograph 1.  The moderator informs the group members that there are further 
researchers behind a one-way mirror also behind the moderator.  Groups of this kind 
are video recorded as standard – such records are part of what is purchased by the 
company or organization that commissions the group.  Part of the skill of moderating 
is to produce interaction that focuses on the commissioning bodies interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1:  Introducing the group 
 
Moderators characteristically start groups of this kind with a general 
introduction covering what the participants should expect and what the topic of 
group is.  The introduction here is typical in the themes it covers.  The extract below 
is from about half a minute into the introduction.  The moderator (henceforth FGM) 
has said she will „explain what we are doing‟ emphasising that it will be 
„straightforward‟ and noting that „companies before they do anything‟: 
 7 
Extract 1: Hair Products
FGM:  Want te (0.2) .hh make su:re that they’re doin  1 
the right thing before they spend lots of money  2 
on it, (0.2) .hh er:m an so they research m:ore 3 
or less anything. 4 
(0.2) 5 
FGM: That they’re thinking of doing. Er:m: (0.8)  6 
tk.hh A:Nd the way they >do that< is te (0.2)  7 
hi:re som’dy like me an give me all ‘o their 8 
ideas.=To kin’ve (.) trot round the country an (.) 9 
show people like you an see what you think o’ them. 10 
.hhh I’VE GOt idea:s for: new products and new  11 
packaging (0.3) u:m to show you, this morning, 12 
.hh u:m (0.4) I work for an independent company, 13 
(0.3) I do:n’t work for:: erm (0.2) ((swallows))  14 
>the people that came up with all this stuff an I 15 
didn’t come up with any of it.< I didn’t do any  16 
of the packaging and I didn’t think of the products.  17 
.hhh an BASically what that means is >I don’t care 18 
what you’re saying.< 19 
(0.3) 20 
FGM:  U:m so you can be: very rude about things, (.) if  21 
you want to be, (0.2) um an you can be very (0.5) 22 
complimentary about things if you want to be an 23 
it doesn’t make .hh any difference to me at all. 24 
Um the important things from my point of view 25 
is that you tell me what you think. .hhh We’ve 26 
got nine of you here, (0.2) um hh wh(hh)ich is 27 
.hhh record. 28 
(0.2) 29 
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FGM: Um tur:nout. .hhh AN:d >that’s basically (cuz) 30 
hopefully you all have different opinions about 31 
things so (0.2) again don’t be poli:te. Um if 32 
you disagree with what someone’s saying then  33 
(.) argue with them. 34 
(0.6) 35 
FGM: KAY? 36 
(0.4) 37 
FGM: Should be straightforward,38 
We will address a number of themes that arise in this introduction, focussing on 
elements that are relevant to our issue of different ways that psychology becomes 
involved in interaction. 
1. Moderator stance and interest 
A basic theme in DP has been the pervasive attention paid by people to issues 
of stake and interest (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  This is closely related to the issue of 
the stance that they have to a particular claim or object (Potter & Hepburn, 2003).  
Moderators attend to these matters because of their potential for effecting the 
contributions of the participants.    
This is a major theme in the extract above, where the moderator is introducing 
what will go on in the group.  Note the emphatic and contrastive organization of lines 
13-19.  One the one hand: 
I work for an independent company, 
And on the other: 
I do:n’t work for:: erm (0.2) ((swallows))  
>the people that came up with all this stuff  
an  
I didn’t come up with any of it.<  
I didn’t do any of the packaging  
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and  
I didn’t think of the products.  
.hhh an  
Note the emphasis on „independent‟ (not the same company who makes the hair 
products), and note the repetition in the description of what the moderator did not 
do.  All of this is cashed out with the following upshot: 
BASically what that means is >I don’t care 
what you’re saying.< 
This might seem overdone and redundant.  But this is an unfamiliar environment for 
the participants, who might well be confused about the relation of the moderator to 
the product ideas.  We can hypothesise that experienced moderators who run groups 
week in and week out have a strong sense of what confusions can arise and how they 
can be reduced. 
The management of stance and interest is not only addressed with this 
rhetorically formatted contrast, it is also handled in the detail of the descriptive 
language.  Part of this is the use of pro-terms.  The „company‟ whose „ideas‟ are to be 
discussed is „they‟ (lines 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7); that is, not „we‟, „our‟ or similar pro-terms 
that would link the moderator and the products.  One of the role of pro-terms is the 
delineation of stake and stance.   Another aspect is FGM‟s descriptive categories for 
the products – „all this stuff‟ (line 15), for example, can be heard as somewhat 
distancing and dismissive, particularly in the context of the series of denials of 
involvement.  The „all this‟ displays a lack of care of discrimination and „stuff‟ is a 
category that displays a lack of concern or precision or knowledge and projects the 
more explicit psychological disclaimer that follows. 
In terms of DP, and particularly theme 1, what we are seeing here is the 
moderator managing her displayed stance on what will be talked about: she is 
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indifferent to whether it seen as positive or negative.  This is stated explicitly, and in 
extrematized form on 24: 
it doesn’t make .hh any difference to me at all. 
By using the extreme formulation the moderator displays her investment in the claim 
(cf. Edwards, 2000).   This builds on the earlier formulation (18-19) „I don‟t care 
what you‟re saying.‟  That is, she does not have a stake in it, and will not have an 
adverse reaction to criticism of the products.   
In terms of a broader DP of institutions (theme 6) the moderator is 
constructing her role as indifferent to participant assessments of products, packaging 
and so on.  In interaction terms, participants will not need to be cautious about 
assessments (they can be „rude‟ or „complimentary‟ – lines 21-3) and they should not 
expect moderator turns such as affiliations or accounts, or displays of upset in 
relation to these assessments.  The moderator is thus working to deactivate the 
pervasive stake and interest orientation of the participants and constructing her 
relation to the product as formal and organizational rather than personal and 
invested. 
2. Moderator knowledge 
One of the basic features of human life is that people are treated as knowing 
things.  People show what they know in what they say in a range of more or less 
explicit and inexplicit ways.  Constructionist and discourse researchers have 
highlighted the different ways in which descriptions are accomplished as literal and 
credible (Potter, 1996); conversation analysts have been more focused on rights and 
responsibilities of epistemics and the way they are bound up with the interaction 
order (Heritage & Raymond, 2005).  These two themes have a range of overlaps (see 
Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, ch. 8).   
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Epistemics are involved in market research focus groups in a wide range of 
different ways.  One feature we highlighted in our previous work is the importance of 
the participants‟ understanding of moderator‟s knowledge for the trajectory of the 
group.  In particular, we noted that asking the moderator questions about the 
product can cause problems.  Apart from generating a possible problem for any 
participants who might disagree with moderator claims, this unhelpfully moves the 
focus away from participant to moderator views. We suggested that moderators tend 
to construct themselves as experts on market research but somewhat naïve or at least 
disinterested in the product itself.   
We are not going to devote much space to it here.  However, note that the 
various components of the introduction that manage stance and stake do a double 
duty in also showing an appropriate lack of knowledge of the product.   Not working 
with the company, or coming up with ideas, suggests an apt lack of knowledge of 
their nature and detail.  Likewise descriptive formulations such as „all this stuff‟ (line 
15) are outsiders descriptions, avoiding any strong familiarity or concern.  And the 
moderator‟s characterization of being given all her ideas to „trot around the country‟ 
with avoids presupposing familiarity or understanding.   
In general, then, the moderator is managing her knowledgeability (theme 1) 
and in doing so contributing to an interactional organization in which she is unlikely 
to be asked about the nature of the product (theme 6). 
3. Displaying Informality 
So far we have focused on the management of psychological implications and 
the way in which the institutional organization of focus groups is produced.  We can 
also consider the role of the moderator‟s psychological display in generating 
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appropriate interaction in the group.  Before there are some things it will be helpful 
to clarify.   
In Puchta & Potter (2004) we distinguish between two broad kinds of 
accounts.  On the one hand, there are accounts that offer descriptions – „this mousse 
works well as it is not sticky’; on the other, there are accounts that focus on epistemic 
issues and particularly limitations of claims – „I find it hard to judge this mousse as I 
have not used it much‟.   Descriptions are often what moderators are after, and may 
be encouraged using a range of practices.  In contrast, epistemic accounts are 
typically unhelpful and unwanted – we found that they are treated as „account 
clutter‟ to be headed off if at all possible. 
How can the moderator generate an environment that encourages 
descriptions but discourages epistemic account clutter?  Part of what the moderator 
does is offer a formulation of how the interaction should unfold „don‟t be polite‟ (32) 
and „argue‟ (34).  However, she also works to generate an environment that 
discourages account clutter through her style of speech and lexical choices.  Although 
we know that this moderator starts her other groups in a very similar way the 
opening sounds spontaneous as if she is making it up as she goes along (certainly not 
learned or recited).  Note also the use of idiomatic and slang terms („trot round the 
country‟, „all this stuff‟), and informal enunciation („kin‟ve‟, „o‟ them‟, „cuz‟, „kay‟).   
Our general point is that the moderator encourages informality not only by 
telling the participants that they need not act formally (they don‟t need to be polite, 
they can argue) but by displaying her own stance to the interaction as informal and 
not rule bound.  Such a display is not dramatic like the shouting of anger or the 
sobbing of extreme upset.  However, it is perfectly suited to the practical task of 
generating what we might colloquially call a relaxed atmosphere and what we might 
more technically describe in terms lexical choice, delivery and accountability. 
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4. POBAs and the mental lexicon 
The American market researcher Naomi Henderson coined the acronym 
POBA for the Perceptions, Opinions, Beliefs and Attitudes that focus groups are 
intended to study (Henderson, 1991).  On the face of it this is a rather odd collection 
of psychological objects.  Opinions, attitudes, perceptions and beliefs are all terms 
that have a somewhat uneasy dual life in everyday in technical social science settings.  
Moreover, if we consider the literature on focus group moderation and analysis it is 
not hard to make the list longer – thoughts, feelings, instincts, views, and more.  
Maybe POBATFIV is a less snappy acronym.   
A more traditional psychological perspective would treat these terms as 
objects of study that are mentally encoded, or at least psychologically bounded in 
some way.  The DP approach here is to bracket off any putative referential specificity 
of these terms – they may or may not refer to mental objects of some kind, in more or 
less technical or everyday practices.  Instead it is concerned with the practical use of 
terms from the mental lexicon.   
If we examine Extract 1 we can see a range of terms that might conventionally 
be treated as psychological in the sense that they are words for desires, mental 
objects or actions.  As a first analytic move we can loosely categorize them: 
 
Desires Actions Mental objects 
want (lines 1, 23, 26) complimentary (line 23) thinking (line 6) 
 rude (line 21) ideas (line 9, 11) 
 polite (line 32) think (line 10, 17, 26) 
 argue (line 34) opinions (line 31) 
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However, this exercise suggests a neatness of the separation of these categories and 
of psychological and non-psychological words that is becomes hard to justify when 
we consider the specifics of this talk.  For instance, given much of lines 1-10 is 
describing what the commissioning company does, and much of 11-17 is describing 
what the moderator does, and much of 18-38 is describing what the participants 
should do not is not clear that the specific words should be treated as psychological.  
It would be possible to consider in detail the literary construction of the 
commissioning company, and the role of this construction in the practice of 
moderation.  A central element in the DP project is considering how descriptions are 
organized to perform practices.  However, given the space let us just concentrate on 
the terms for mental objects. 
Thinking.  The term thinking here could not easily be taken as a simple 
cognitive referent given its application to a rather loosely specified commissioning 
company.  The term works well in this context to specify something like a loose plan 
or objective that may not come to fruition.  Also, thinking suggests something 
conceptual and creative, thought up.  Crucially, it presents the work that has gone 
into the materials that the focus group participants will discuss as being provisional.  
It therefore presents the participants‟ task as appropriately important – thinking is 
something that can be changed.   
Ideas.  The word „ideas‟ complements „thinking‟, of course.  Again, it would be 
hard to take „ideas‟ here as having a simple cognitive referent.  They are treated as 
objects that can be given to the moderator and shown to group members.  This 
notion too suggests conceptual content.  It too suggests something that is provisional 
and can be changed.  This again constructs the role of the participants as practical 
and appropriate – they are involved in a process that can influence something. 
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Think.  The word „think‟ is used in two different ways here.  The use on line 17 
(„I didn‟t think of the products‟) is similar to „thinking‟ above.  The point here is the 
moderator stressing her non-involvement, particular her non-involvement with the 
creation of the products.  The occurrences on lines 10 and 26 are classic POBA uses.  
That is, the moderator is after „what you think‟ of the products.  „Think‟ is nicely open 
– it can involve evaluations, but is not restricted to that.  Moreover, it is not 
necessarily something that has to be worked at or calculated or assessed (although it 
does not exclude that).  Although „what you think‟ appears a very open request it is 
interesting to consider what it nevertheless discourages.  One of the features of POBA 
questions that we identified in our broader analysis was that they are not easy to 
respond to in two ways that are very troublesome in focus groups, namely with „don‟t 
knows‟ or with questions for the moderator.   It is seems to be hard not to have any 
thought about something, and thoughts are personal in a way that means the 
moderator should not be expected to improve on them.  So if we think about „think‟ 
in terms of a relatively open generation of responses, that nevertheless heads off 
some problem responses, we can see its practical value in the setting. 
Opinions.  This is another classic POBA term.  The term „opinion‟ perhaps 
suggests a more developed  or more publicly stated position than „think‟, although 
the OED defines the former in terms of the latter: „what one thinks or how one thinks 
about something‟ (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989).  The definition highlights an 
aspect of „opinion‟ that is particularly relevant here: „resting on grounds insufficient 
for complete demonstration‟.  That suggests something that by definition is not fully 
accountable.  It is talk that participants can offer with less threat of being asked to 
provide a full justification (see Myers, 2004, for an extended and highly pertinent 
discussion of opinion talk in the context of focus groups).  Put another way, opinions 
provide a sympathetic frame for participants to offer a range of their own „views‟ 
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(thoughts, perceptions, etc.).  Characterising participants‟ talk in this way encourages 
its production.  There is a further element to this.  POBA talk, including opinion talk, 
is typically presented by moderators as something straightforward.  POBAs are items 
that can be delivered immediately – they do not have to be worked out.  We will 
develop this below.  However, even in this extract we can see the moderator working 
up the task as easy and uncomplicated.  Note the way the moderator ends this 
package of instructions with this emphasis on the task for the participants being 
straightforward (line 38). 
What we have tried to do in this discussion is highlight four different ways in 
which psychology plays a practical and interactional role in the work of focus group 
moderation.  While these have picked up themes 1 (the psychological implications of 
talk), theme 2 (the psychological thesaurus) and theme 4 (the display or embodiment 
of psychology), taken together they contribute to the emerging interest in the way 
psychological practices are partly constitutive of institutional practices.  In the next 
section we will develop this analysis  
Thought in practice 
The following extract comes from about 14 minutes in the group, after the 
moderator has spent a bit of time with an exercise learning the participants‟ names 
(P2 etc. mark the position of screen grabs).   
 
Hair products: First thoughts 
FGM: The result is astonishing.=with new organics  P2 1 
styling elixir, .hh you’ll have perfect control 2 
with only a few drops, but no-one will know you’ve 3 
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used a styling produ:ct. 4 
(1.4) 5 
FGM: So.  ((FGM scans group)) 6 
(2.2)  ((FGM scans group)) 7 
FGM: First thou:ghts on that. 8 
Ann: What- what is it. 9 
(0.2) 10 
Ann: Is it a gel, (0.2) or a (.) mou:sse, or a 11 
(1.0) 12 
Liz: ‘Tsa [new prod]uct.= 13 
Ann:      [Jsst a- ] 14 
Ann: =New:- [ a new hair] right.=A new product. 15 
Liz:   [huh huh huh] 16 
Peg: T’jsst like a spray is it. 17 
40 seconds omitted 18 
FGM: Others’ ther- first thoughts?=Ella first 19 
thoughts on this? 20 
(0.2) 21 
Ella: Mghm* (0.4) w’ll my fir:st thou:ght when it   P3 22 
said you could use a few drops is (0.3) yeah. 23 
ri:ght. 24 
(0.2) 25 
Ella: Ahh[uhh!  (0.3)       ] 26 
Various:        [((quiet laughter))] 27 
(0.3) 28 
Ella: Cos when- ye know when you get- read the back of  29 
the mousse thing and it says do a little golf  P4 30 
ball. An you get this (a[mazing)   (3.0)     ]  P5 31 
Various:     [ ((Loud laughter))  ] 32 
FGM: >Huh huh< using a nhetball’s whorth. 33 
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Ella: Yheah [exhactlyh. Hah.h    ] 34 
FGM:  [>huh huh huh huh<] 35 
Ella: .hh I’m like mm. .hh er:m (0.3) so a few 36 
drops: [ was  my  ] fir:st thought. and the  37 
FGM:   [((coughs))] 38 
Ella: second one w’s .hh (0.4) if it’s soft to the  39 
touch an doesn’t look like you’ve used a styling 40 
product, (0.5) then how (0.2) can it work. 41 
FGM: Mh[m:?] 42 
Ella:   [(Ma]ke) se:nse. [(I m’n)] 43 
FGM:           [Yeh?   ] 44 
(0.4)45 
*throat clear 
There is a lot going on in this sequence.  What we will do is take up DP themes 
2 and 4 and develop them further with material that offer more participant uptake, 
and therefore a possibly more nuanced analytic purchase.  Let us start with some 
brief further comments on theme 4, psychological display, and move onto a more 
detailed consideration of theme 2, the psychological thesaurus. 
Reading as Psychological Display 
We have already noted something that might be glossed as „informality‟ as one 
kind of „psychological display‟.   Another sort of display comes in the first 4 lines of 
Extract 2.  The moderator is doing reading.  That is, she is using a recognizable 
reading inflection.  This goes along with her holding up a board on which the  
product description is written (Picture 2 suggests that at least some of the 
participants can read the description that FGM is reading out).  The combination of 
board and inflection makes it very clear that the moderator is reporting something 
rather than offering her own opinions of the product.  As we have noted above, 
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showing that they are naïve and with respect to, and independent from, the product 
is something that helps establish the characteristic organizational pattern of a market 
research focus group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Moderator reads „astonishing‟ (line 1) 
 
Up to now this phenomenon has been understood using Goffman‟s different 
footing categories (Goffman, 1981 – for interactional approaches to reported speech 
see Holt, 1996; Wooffitt, 1992).  One thing that this very emphatic display of reading 
does is present the words uttered as not those of the speaker, who acts as relayer of 
views rather than origin.  The management of footing, then, is inter alia the 
management of the speaker‟s own involvement and accountability.  By using the 
reading voice and the board the moderator makes it clear that she is not responsible 
for the words.  This heads off problem actions such as asking her about their 
meaning or quality.  More broadly it reproduces the important moderator distinction 
between marketing expertise and product naiveté.   
First thoughts, gestures, and the psychological thesaurus 
We have noted above that „think‟ is one of the typical POBA terms that are 
used in focus groups.  The term „thoughts‟ is closely related to this (the OED has an 
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item of mental activity, a thing that is in mind, an idea or notion).  Let us make a few 
observations about the moderator‟s use of „thoughts‟ and the participants‟ uptake. 
First, note what happens before the first use in the extract (and the group) in 
line 8.  The moderator ends the reading from the card by putting the card down, 
pausing and then saying „so‟ with terminal intonation.  At the same time she scans 
the group.  All of this seems to suggest that some contribution on the part of the 
group members is being encouraged – although none is forthcoming.  It is after 
further delay that the moderator asks for „first thoughts on that‟, which generates an 
immediate response. 
We have already suggested that moderators treat POBA items as things that 
can be delivered immediately.  In this case, the construction „first thoughts‟ 
highlights this immediacy – what is wanted is not „thought through‟, calculated, or 
refined.  Furthermore, the emphasis on first thoughts may generate a particularly 
safe environment for responding as any item offered need be defended as only a first 
thought.  
If we consider what the participants‟ offer there are a number of interesting 
features of lines 8-17.  Ann starts with something that has the grammatical form of a 
question, although it is not delivered with questioning intonation, nor is it answered 
(directly).  Liz‟s contribution on line 13 superficially seems like an answer – however, 
the emphasis on „new‟ suggests more a collaborative „reasoning‟ about the product 
from the description.  The request for „first thoughts‟, then, generates questions and 
observations about the product‟s nature.  The moderator lets this run for some time, 
thereby treating it as appropriate for the research task.  
After this interaction appears to run down and become repetitive the 
moderator repeats the first thoughts request, this time specifying first „others‟ in 
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general (that is, members who have not contributed), and then selecting a particular 
group member, Ella, who has not yet contributed to this particular discussion.   
Others’ ther- first thoughts?=Ella first 
thoughts on this? 
It is not clear from the video if Ella has shown signs of wishing to contribute that the 
FGM has picked up.  Whatever the case, having been specifically selected by the 
moderator she works up to an elaborate response.  This is beautifully complex and 
prefaced with a clear orientation to the „first thought‟ construction of the question: 
w’ll my fir:st thou:ght when it said   
you could use a few drops is (0.3)  
yeah. ri:ght. 
Ella specifies the particular element of the description (note „when it said‟ not „when 
you said‟, showing the success of the moderator‟s footing management) and 
characterises her first thought as an ironic agreement (i.e. a disagreement). The irony 
is delivered hearably through the intonational contour.  Note that Ella follows it on 
line 26 with an extended and inflected laughter particle which sets off quiet laughter 
across the group.  It may be that although the irony was clear the action Ella was 
doing with it was not yet so – it might have been complaining, for example, for which 
laughter would have been inappropriate. Ella‟s own laughter, therefore, acted as a 
guide. 
Ella then explicates her ironic response to the „few drops‟ description by 
reporting what happens with mousse.  This is presented in scripted terms as 
something that happens in a standard way.  The description starts verbally with „it 
says do a little golf ball‟ and is followed through with an expansive circular gesture.  
This occasions loud laughter from the group members and the moderator follows the 
laughter with a formulation of the sense of the gesture as „using a netball‟s worth‟.  
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(We can speculate that the moderator may formulate the sense of non-verbal 
elements of the interaction such as this to clarify them to the research users whose 
video record provides only a restricted view).  Ella agrees with the FGM‟s formulation 
and both laugh.  Pictures 3-5 illustrate this.  Picture three is where Ella is saying „first 
thought‟.  Picture 4 is from where she is saying little „golf ball‟ – she is making a small 
shape in her palm with the fingers of her other hand.  Then in picture 5 is part of the 
expansive circular gesture as if she has a very large ball on her lap, this still 
accompanies the word „amazing‟. 
We have spent a bit of time on Ella‟s contribution here as it shows the value 
and flexibility of asking for „thoughts‟ in this setting.  Ella offers a precisely 
constructed description of a problem with mousse specifically raised by part of the 
blurb read by the moderator.  She characterises this as her first thought, developing 
it with a non-vocal, but highly intelligible enactment, receipted by the moderator 
who both shows her shared understanding of what Ella is saying and showing, and 
makes the sequence more clearly intelligible to the production workers who are 
watching behind the one-way mirror and who will watch the video of the interaction.   
Some social psychologists have suggested that gesture is a form of „visible 
thought‟ (Beattie, 2004).  What we see here is a combination of talk and gesture 
being used to satisfy the request for a „first thought‟.  Whether any of this was or even 
could be „going on in Ella‟s mind‟ at the moment of hearing the product blurb, it is 
deftly appropriate to the work of the focus group when it is delivered.  The gesture, 
the words and the „first thought‟ are all part of a public and intelligible piece of 
interaction.  Although psychologists and market researchers might treat POBAs as 
mental entities of one kind or another, and although it may be a practical shorthand 
to do so for some purposes, perhaps the design of new forms of hair mousse, the 
POBA language is working here precisely because of its public and visible nature.   
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Pictures 3-5: „First thought‟; „little golf ball‟; „amazing…‟ 
 
Practices of Moderation and Psychology 
In this chapter we have documented a number of ways in which psychology 
and discourse are inextricably bound together.  It has attempted to explicate 
psychology from an interactional perspective.  This has involved remained agnostic 
with respect to the nature, status or absence of psychological states and entities 
enclosed within any of the participants.  Instead the focus has been on how 
„psychological‟ phenomena are live in the practices we see here.    
Theme 1 – psychological implications 
We have shown how the moderator manages the psychological implications of 
her talk, in particular she constructs a disinterested stance on the product, stressing 
her lack of stake in its origins, quality or success.  At the same time she constructs 
her knowledgeability carefully, emphasising her knowledge of market research 
procedures but her lack of knowledge of the product itself. 
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Theme 2 – the psychological thesaurus 
We explored the way the moderator uses a range of items from the 
psychological thesaurus, in particular the way she uses POBA terms in questions for 
the participants.  Our analysis focused on think, opinions, and first thoughts.  These 
items can be parts of questions that are hard not to not respond to – they are items 
that participants should be their own expert on, and they are less susceptible to 
discounting as flawed than factual or knowledge items.  They are also relatively open 
items – although they tend not to occasion „account clutter‟, they occasion a range of 
descriptions including, loosely speaking, features such as questions, observations, 
and non-vocal displays. 
Theme 4 – psychological display and embodiment 
We considered the way the moderator displayed her psychological state.  We 
illustrated this both with the moderator‟s construction of informality and with her 
footing as the relayer of others‟ views.   Both of these displays have practical 
consequences for conduct within the group – the displayed informality encourages 
participation but discourages account clutter; the footing as relayer sustains the 
separation of moderator from company, making it clear that personal views are not 
being delivered.  Note that this psychological display is in the service of producing 
the normative organization of the market research focus group; we are not 
suggesting that there is some specific feature of this moderator.  Rather, the 
psychological displays are generic features of producing the organization. 
Theme 5 –research methods in practice 
The analysis of this chapter has further specified the specific procedures 
through which different elements of focus groups are produced.  In particular has 
considered the way psychological terms, orientations and constructions are drawn on 
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in the practices of the group.  As we noted above, we have developed this interest 
with these materials much more elsewhere.  This blurs into theme 6. 
Theme 6 – discursive psychology and institutional organization 
One of the things we have tried to do here is show the way that psychological 
terms and orientations are drawn on to produce the distinctive business of the 
setting.  In this case, the management of stance, interest, and knowledgeability, the 
displays of informality and „just reading‟, and the use of POBA language (opinions, 
thoughts) are all coordinated together to generate the distinctive structural 
organization of the focus group.   
Let us end this chapter with some general observations about the nature of 
psychology and the applied potential of work of this kind.  First, psychology.  What 
we have tried to do here is highlight how psychology and interaction may come 
together.  That is, we have tried to explicate the way phenomena that are traditionally 
thought of as psychological – motive, knowledge, ideas and so on – are parts of 
interaction.  This is what is distinctive in discursive psychology – it focuses on the 
way these things are part of discourse practices rather than how they are individual 
or mental objects.  What we have done here is just the briefest sketch of the range of 
range of discursive psychology themes and how they might come together in one 
setting.  Each would be the stimulus to a full study. 
With respect to application, we have written extensively on this topic 
elsewhere (Puchta & Potter, 2004).  One of the things we noted in previous work was 
that the stipulations in how-to-do-it manuals for focus group moderators were 
sometimes out of line with the practices of highly skilled moderators.  For example, 
although manuals may emphasise that moderator questions ought to be simple and 
one-dimensional in practice a range of elaborations were used, particularly in topic 
initial questions (Puchta & Potter, 1999).  For reasons of this kind, we suggested that 
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application might be more effective if it took examples of good practice and 
attempted to explicate their operation.  This might allow moderators to take a more 
strategic approach to their actions.  In effect, we were hoping that moderators could 
turn practices into strategies.  Note that in this case, focus group researchers might 
offer a more depth or psychodynamic approach to „first thoughts‟ that would 
emphasise irrational dynamics or subjective meanings.  First thoughts might be 
treated is relatively uncontaminated by rationalization or social processes, for 
example.  Our analysis does not show such classically psychological interpretations 
to be wrong – it is precisely and systematically agnostic to such things as its starting 
position (Potter & Edwards, 2003).  However, it does offer a more interactionally 
guided account of what POBA constructions of this kind may be doing and ultimately 
studies that highlight conversational pragmatics in this way may raise challenging 
questions for cognitive or psychodynamic accounts (Edwards, 1997).  
Our interest here has been rather different.  If there is an applied focus to this 
chapter it is a critical one.  We have highlighted the limitations of individual and 
cognitive understandings of psychology in favour of understandings that are 
interactional and jointly constructed.  Its use is a positive and negative one, 
cautioning against particular kinds of psychological picture and offering an image of 
psychology in practice that is dynamic and collaborative. 
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